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Abstract
Defense contractor financial performance is traditionally measured using accounting
profit. In academic literature, accounting profit has been proxied through different applications
of accounting rates of return. However, the use of these rates pose certain limitations. First,
accounting rates of return have been applied inconsistently. Next, academic research has not
typically assessed accounting returns against a firm’s opportunity costs. As a result, there is a
literature gap in defense research that assesses whether defense contractors earn sustainable
returns beyond the cost to produce those returns.
This exploratory research aims to address the research gap in defense contractor
financial performance by examining economic profit. This thesis adopts the concept of
competitive advantage as a measure of economic profit. Economic profit, proxied by economic
moat, is superior to the current methods used in academic literature because it considers the
following: Return on Invested Capital, an accounting rate of return, and Weighted Average Cost
of Capital, an economic rate of return. Firms with economic moat possess attributes such as
intangible asset investments, efficiency scale, cost advantages, and pricing power. Firms that
have sustained competitive advantage with these attributes have built moats, or defenses, that
prevent competition, preserve profits, and create long‐term value.
This study finds that defense contractors’ intangible assets investments are negatively
associated with economic moat while efficiency scale is positively associated with economic
moat. Neither cost advantages nor pricing power indicated significant relationships. An
implication from this finding is that defense contractors’ asset investments are a potential driver
in sustained competitive advantage which is a critical element for the Department of Defense to
advance its national defense strategies.
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ECONOMIC MOAT: A LINE OF DEFENSE FOR THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY

I. Introduction

Background
The study of defense contractor financial performance has most often been motivated
by scrutinizing levels of profitability. In academic literature, defense contractor profit levels
traditionally have been measured by accounting rates of return. A commonly used rate is Return
on Assets (ROA), but the vast scope of studies have also analyzed metrics such as share price
appreciation and net worth. Accounting rates of return can be appropriate proxies to measure
defense contractor profit because they are calculated from objective data such as financial
statements. Especially for public defense contractors, accounting and financial reports are
available through the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or through other publicly‐
accessible research databases. However, the use of accounting rates of return to assess
contractors’ profitability has certain limitations.
An issue observed in academic literature is that accounting rates of return have been
applied inconsistently, which has been identified as a weakness by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO, 1986). Another issue is that accounting rates of return defense
contractor profit studies are not normally compared against defense contractor’s opportunity
costs. As a result, there is a lack of defense literature that compares defense contractors’
returns beyond the cost to produce those returns. This comparison provides crucial implications
on defense contractors’ ability to enjoy long‐term operational stability.
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Motivation
Profit studies in defense research have traditionally used accounting rates of return
which has created a literature gap in assessing financial performance as economic profit. This
thesis adopts Morningstar’s concept of competitive advantage as a measure of economic profit
for defense contractors. Economic profit, proxied by economic moat, is superior to the current
methods used in literature because it considers the following: accounting rate of return, or
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) and economic rate of return, or Weighted Average Cost of
Capital (WACC). For accounting rates of return to derive useful information, they must be
compared to economic rates of return.
Fisher and McGowan (1983) critique the use of accounting rates of return as an index of
profit‐relationships. They posit that accounting rates of return can be subject to measurement
problems such as applying inconsistent financial reporting and neglecting to account for
inflation. Further, Fisher and McGowan (1983) point to a more fundamental issue that
accounting rates of return do not measure economic rates of return. They describe economic
rates of return on an investment as a discount rate equal to the present value of a firm’s
expected revenue stream to its initial outlay. By this definition, an economic rate of return is the
minimum return that a firm must earn from its revenue such that the revenue stream equals its
initial investment. Additionally, an economic rate of return above the cost of capital promotes
expansion in a competitive environment (Fisher and McGowan, 1983). An economic rate of a
return indicates whether a project is feasible when compared to the project’s capital
investment. Additionally, where economic rates of return are positive, not only is the project
feasible, but it is also a value‐added project that may provide returns which can be re‐invested.
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Because of defense contractors’ operational environment in serving a unique customer,
the Department of Defense (DoD), it is relevant to assess their capabilities that enable sustained
competitive advantage, known as “economic moat” (Morningstar Investment Research
Database). A notable and practical interpretation of economic moat is explained by Warren
Buffett, chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway. At the 1995 Berkshire Hathaway annual
shareholder meeting, Buffet described the principles that define moat, some of which are being
a low‐cost producer, having a natural franchise because of surface capabilities, having a certain
position in the consumers’ mind, or possessing a technological advantage. He also implores
understanding the factors of a company’s moat that enable it to successfully operate over
decades‐long periods (Buffet, 1995).
There are several reasons why economic profit, or economic moat, is a superior
measure of defense contractors’ financial performance. First, economic moat portrays more
about a firm’s operational performance than profit alone. Boyd (2005) found that firms with
economic moat achieved high earnings, high stability, and stock growth relative to the market.
Economic moat is also associated with share price appreciation (Boyd and Quinn, 2006) and less
price volatility (Kanuri and McLeod, 2016) compared to broad‐based stock market indices.
Additionally, the study of economic moat addresses the literature gap of comparing defense
contractor returns to the cost of producing those returns. If defense contractors demonstrate
sustained returns above their capital outlays, then they are able to create “defenses” or barriers
against competition. An implication of economic moat is that defense contractors can preserve
profits from rivals and maintain long‐term operations, which are critical elements for the DoD to
achieve its national defense strategies.
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As commercial enterprises, it is reasonable to expect defense contractors to pursue
profits. Further, healthy financial performance is implicitly stated in Presidential decree.
According to Executive Order 12919 (1994), the U.S. government’s policy is to strengthen the
domestic industrial and technological base to ensure full national security capabilities. Because
national security is a provision by the federal government, the defense provided by the DoD is
an essential public good. As a result, the DoD must look to industry contractors for defense
acquisitions. The inseparability of private industry in producing a public good therefore
necessitates operational profit, protected by economic moat, to sustain the domestic industrial
base.
Specific attributes of companies with economic moat are intangible asset investments
which prevent competitors from replicating intellectual property; efficiency scale which
represents a limited market being efficiently served by one or very few companies; cost
advantages that allow a firm to negotiate terms; and pricing power resulting from high customer
switching costs (Morningstar Investment Research Center). A firm’s network effect, which
occurs when the value of a good or service increases as more people use that good or service,
can also be a source of competitive advantage (Morningstar Investment Research Center). Many
attributes of economic moat apply to the study of defense contractor financial performance due
to the government acquisition environment and DoD customer requirements. The relevance of
competitive advantage therefore directs this research to analyze variables not widely discussed
in defense academic research.

13

Research Objectives and Questions
The objective of this exploratory research is to assess defense contractors’ financial
performance using economic profit. Fundamentally, this thesis is similar to defense profit
studies which use a proxy profit, usually an accounting rate of return, that are assessed against
relevant predictors in the defense industry. The novelty of this research, however, is measuring
defense contractor performance by adopting competitive advantage as a proxy for economic
profit. To measure competitive advantage, this thesis will leverage Morningstar’s proprietary
concept of economic moat which compares ROIC and WACC. Further, this thesis will analyze
specific economic moat attributes, such as defense contractors’ intangible asset investments
and efficient use of capital assets, to assess their impact on moat.
Considering the attributes of economic moat, this research is directed by the following
questions:
1. How is economic moat impacted by the capital investments in assets that defense
contractors make?
2. What factors in defense contractors’ operational environment represent efficiency and
productivity measures that positively influence economic moat?
3. How does economic moat differ depending on the type of defense contracts held?

14

Thesis Overview
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter two synthesizes the academic research on
defense contractor financial performance, economic moat, competitive advantage, and related
studies. Chapter three describes the methodology, hypothesis development, and the data
selection process. Chapter four presents results and analysis of the tests of hypotheses. Finally,
chapter five concludes with key findings and suggestions for future research.
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II. Literature Review

Overview
This chapter will first explore a range of literature on defense contractor profit to
highlight the variety of performance measurements and research outcomes. The literature
review will also cover ancillary research on cost shifting. The topics of contractor profit and cost
shifting are frequently discussed together because cost shifting is seen as a systematic way for
contractors to internally adjust costs and influence profit. Additionally, elements from public
choice theory will be applied. The study of defense contractor financial performance warrants
consideration of the public choice paradigm since corporate profit at the expense of American
taxpayers highlights potential issues of inefficient government spending or waste in government
resources. Finally, studies on economic moat and competitive advantage will be analyzed.
Economic moat has mostly been conceptualized in practical investment research such as expert
analyst reports used by investors. Limited academic research exists on moat but relevant studies
on competitive advantage have been considered. These topics will enhance the understanding
of economic moat and demonstrate its applicability to defense contractor performance.

Defense Contractor Profit Studies
The purpose of reviewing profit studies is to demonstrate the range of empirical
analyses conducted and to summarize the conclusions researched. Studies from a range of
different periods indicate that defense contractor performance has been assessed using
different measurements from sales and profit metrics to market valuations as outlined in Table
1, but the most common metric is ROA. ROA has the potential to understate a firm’s return from
16

assets since non‐operational expenses have been accounted for. Additionally, a firm might not
be employing every asset in its operations. For example, an intangible asset such as Goodwill
measures the premium that an acquiring firm paid over the market value of the purchased firm.
Accounting rules (FASB, 2017) permit the reporting of Goodwill, but as an asset it is not engaged
in production in the same way that assets like plant and equipment are employed. The following
table summarizes the range of profit measures used in the referenced literature. Notably, ROA is
a commonly used proxy, but studies have applied different formulations.
Table 1 – Literature Summary of Profit Metrics
Effect Studied

Author

Proxy

Formula
Return on Investments (ROI)* was the designated formula, however
investments were classified as "assets employed" for DoD contracts
U.S. GAO (1986)
Operating income / Assets owned by company
Lichtenberg (1992)
Operating income / Identifiable assets
McGowan & Vendrzyk (2002) Return on Assets (ROA)
Segment income / Segment assets
Income before extraordinary items & discontinued operations plus R&D
Zhong & Gribbin (2009)
expense / Avg. total assets for year t and year t‐1 of firm i
Defense Contractor
Wang & San Miguel (2012)
Net income / Total assets
Profit
Chen & Gunny (2014)
Earnings before extraordinary items / Total assets
Bohi (1973)
Profit as % of net worth
Profit as % of net worth
Greer & Liao (1986)
Return on Sales
Unknown ‐ Obtained from ValueLine
Return on Common Equity Net income / Common equity
Wang & San Miguel (2012) Profit Margin Ratio
Net income / Sales revenue
Operating Margin Ratio
Earnings before interest & taxes / Sales
Greer & Liao (1986)
Return on Net Worth
Unknown ‐ Obtained from ValueLine
Shareholder Wealth Pownall (1986)
Shareholder Wealth
Returns based on weighted NYSE market index
Economic Profit
Rogerson (1989)
Economic Profit
Share prices before & after contract award
Investment Returns Stigler & Friedland (1971)
Profit of Investments
Investment returns on defense contractors relative to NYSE stocks
DFAIR (1985)*

A variety of studies have compared defense contractor performance relative to industry
peers. The comparison to industry provides implications on whether defense contractors earn
superior profits than non‐defense firms. Measuring profit rates as a percentage net of worth,
LMI found that defense contractor profit rates on defense business are too low compared to
commercial firms (LMI, 1970). Using the same profit metric as LMI, Weidenbaum found that
defense profits are more excessive than commercial businesses of similar sales volume
(Weidenbaum, 1986). Weidenbaum also concludes that defense business is becoming more
profitable due to a higher concentration among fewer defense firms. Bohi’s research, which
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used the same profit rate, produced a different outcome from either of LMI’s and
Weidenbaum’s findings. Bohi (1973) instead concluded that defense firms and non‐defense
manufacturing firms did not have significantly different profits during the period of analysis,
1960‐1969.
Another comparison between defense and non‐defense firms was conducted in 1985 by
the Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR). Using return on sales and return on
investment or “assets employed,” DFAIR’s principal findings were that defense contractors had
similar profit to commercial manufacturers with the exception of certain periods: from 1970 to
1979 defense contractors were 35 percent more profitable than commercial business, and from
1980 to 1983 defense contractors were 120 percent more profitable. In 1986, the U.S General
Accountability Office (GAO) validated profit findings from DFAIR’s 1985 report. Using return on
assets (ROA) to measure profit, the GAO (1986) concluded that defense business was
substantially more profitable than comparable non‐defense firms during the period 1975 to
1983.
Recent research also compared defense and commercial business. Using ROA as a proxy
for excessive profit, Wang and San Miguel defined “excessive profit” as the difference calculated
between firm‐year profit and the benchmark profit of the same firm‐year. The explanation of
observed profit levels was owed to certain predictors: corporate governance and industry
consolidation after 1992 (Wang and San Miguel, 2012). What is meant by corporate governance
is that a company CEO also holds a Chairman role. They posit that such dual authority leads to
less oversight from the board of directors. As a result, management can engage in opportunistic
behavior to impact financial outcomes. The other finding of defense industry consolidation after
1992 potentially explains excessive profits since fewer, less fragmented contractors face less
18

competition among each other. These contractors can therefore consolidate their bargaining
power and exert more political influence in the defense acquisition process. Wang and San
Miguel’s industry consolidation hypothesis extends Weidenbaum’s domestic convergence
hypothesis that higher profit results from defense business concentration among fewer defense
firms (Weidenbaum, 1968). However, the notion that defense business concentration impacts
profit remains mixed.
Among firms that serve both defense and commercial customers, another relative
measure of defense contractor profit is defense sales in proportion to total sales. Greer and Liao
(1986) measured firms’ return on sales (ROS) as a function of a percentage of defense sales and
return on net worth as a function of a percentage of defense sales. In both tests, it was
consistently found that defense business negatively impacted overall sales for corporate firms
during 1963 to 1982 (Greer and Liao, 1986). Bohi (1973), however, found no such relationship.
Interestingly, he noted that firms’ individual profit rates did not necessarily move in the same
direction as the percentage of defense business. Similarly, Lichtenberg (1992) compared profits
of government business relative to non‐defense business. He hypothesized that commercial
business by government contractors is higher than profitability of commercial business by non‐
government contractors under a cost shifting premise. Using ROA, Lichtenberg demonstrated
that profit increases as a contractor’s ratio of governmental to total sales increases, concluding
that defense contractors earn a range of 68‐82 percent higher profit compared to non‐
government contractors; during the period 1983‐1989 profit was almost three times higher for
government contractors. Lichtenberg suggests that the relationship between profit and a firm’s
percentage of government sales to total sales is a positive linear function. Using the comparison
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of firm defense sales (or government) to total sales, profit studies have also yielded mixed
results on defense contractor financial performance.
Academic literature has considered defense contractor performance through metrics
other than sales, also with mixed conclusions. Stigler and Friedland (1971) measured
profitability of investments in prime defense contractors instead of profit from sales. They
contend that using stock market data avoids potential inconsistencies reported through
accounting data. Covering two decades of stock returns, Stigler and Friedland (1971) found that
investments in defense contractors during the 1950’s were twice as profitable compared to
stocks listed in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). During this period, growth in stock prices
was positively associated with a larger percentage of defense sales. However, in the 1960’s, this
pattern did not hold (Stigler and Friedland, 1971).
Rogerson (1989) includes the use of stock market data to measure defense contractors’
economic profit. Rogerson’s theory on prizes for innovation asserts that the regulatory system
for defense contractors promotes innovative efforts by providing prizes, or economic profit in
the form of stock price appreciation. Under this system, the innovative phase of a project earns
negative economic profit while the production phase earns a positive profit. In his empirical
analysis, Rogerson’s evaluated defense contractors’ security prices to determine their market
value before and after the announcement of the winner and loser(s) of a prime contract.
Changes in market value are used as a proxy for prize level because in absence of a prize, firms
would not expect to receive economic profit and the stock market would respond indifferently
to the announcement of prime contract winner. The analysis involved 12 major aerospace
systems involving programs occurring through the 1960 and 1970 decades. Rogerson’s findings
indicate that every dollar of revenue earned on a prime contractor’s production contract
20

generates 3.26 to 4.68 cents of economic profit. One of Rogerson’s conclusions is that profit
policy serves as a way to regulate the level of innovation among defense contractors. Where
previous studies focused on relative levels of profit, Rogerson shifts the debate from whether
contractors earn too much profit to whether there is an adequate level of innovation being
produced.
Like Rogerson (1989), Zhong and Gribbin (2009) shift the focus of defense contractor
profit away from scrutinizing profit levels to exploring a diversity of performance factors that
explain profitability. Specifically, they investigated whether risk, innovation, and influence are
attributes that are positively associated with defense contractor profitability. Unlike previous
studies, Zhong and Gribbin did not assess profit relative to non‐defense industry peers, but
similarly used ROA to proxy profit. Zhong and Gribbin’s examination was compelled in part by
DoD defense policy which acknowledges that the determination of contractor profitability
should consider the contractors’ risk, difficulty of the task, and procurement resources. Zhong
and Gribbin’s empirical findings support their hypothesis that risk, innovation, and influence
have a positive relationship with defense contractor profit rates.
The literature has demonstrated that many alternatives exist in assessing defense
contractors’ performance. ROA has commonly been used to represent firm profit, but ROA has
also been applied differently among the various studies. Research has also considered defense
contractor performance through metrics other than sales such as stock market valuation which
is a relevant and applicable measure. To understand on relative profit levels, defense
contractors’ profitability has often been compared to non‐defense industry peers. The variety
performance metrics have accordingly led to a variety of conclusions on relative profit levels of
defense contractors.
21

Cost Shifting Studies
The topic of cost shifting is relevant to the study of defense contractor performance
because academic literature has explored cost shifting as an explanation of profit. Additionally,
many profit proxies used in cost shifting research are similar to those used to defense contractor
research that do not have a cost shifting focus. In defense contractor research, cost shifting
implies that contractors will pass its commercial costs onto its government payer (McGowan
and Vendrzyk, 2002). As a result, non‐related government costs are potentially reimbursed
through government‐related contracts. Cost shifting occurs where there is both an opportunity
and incentive to do so, such as compensating for losses in one segment by shifting costs to a
profitable segment. Theoretically, cost shifting can occur throughout a firm’s operational levels;
for example, costs can be shifted among expense types, operating units, and customer bases.
Quite possibly, cost shifting is more so a byproduct of a management decision rather than an
objective. An entity might engage in cost shifting if the economics of a contract will warrant it‐‐
which may not be the case for every contract or business opportunity. The following literature
demonstrates systematic ways in which cost shifting can occur and also how cost shifting can
influence defense contractor profit levels.

Cost Shifting in Hospital Billing Studies
Although the empirical focus of this thesis is the defense industry, this section will first
present research from the healthcare industry where cost shifting literature is prolific, especially
pertaining to hospital billings. The healthcare and defense industries differ in the type of
product and service each provide, but the two industries are also similar in certain areas. First,
22

by contracting with the government, hospitals and defense contractors are compensated
through arrangements that are unique to federal acquisitions, such as reimbursement‐type
provisions. Next, these reimbursement structures are subject to certain regulations that attempt
to control public spending; healthcare reform is subject to the Affordable Care Act
(HealthCare.gov) and government contractors are subject to cost regulation set by Cost
Accounting Standards (Acquisition.gov). As a result, much scrutiny is placed on public healthcare
programs and defense spending because both are taxpayer‐funded. Finally, the applicability of
healthcare research in the study of defense contractor research lies in common characteristics
that ensue cost shifting behavior.
In the healthcare industry, Medicare and Medicaid are the federal insurance programs
that are either fully or partially funded by the government depending on the specific coverage
plans (Medicare.gov). The reimbursement characteristic of these federal insurance programs
present opportunities for hospital billing practices to influence the reimbursement outcome. But
in addition to opportunity, incentive must also exist. Assume an environment in which patient
healthcare costs are billed at a flat rate regardless of medical procedure. Additionally, the
hospital recoups full payment for these costs through insurance coverage or through patients’
personal funds. The hospital would therefore experience no difference in revenue received by
medical procedures performed and by payment type. In this assumed scenario, there is no
opportunity or incentive to shift costs from one patient to another because the cost and billing
environments are homogenous. In reality, healthcare costs differ by the type of medical
procedure, complexity of care, and specialization of treatments to name a few examples.
Further, patients’ ability to pay for their healthcare costs depends on having a range of coverage
plans or no coverage at all. Medicare or Medicaid programs introduce a billing and pricing
23

dynamic such that patients with these coverage types pay reduced rates though expense
subsidization by the government. Therefore, hospitals have both opportunity and incentive to
shift costs among its patients, especially since hospitals set different rates for their services and
experience different payment collectability between private and public payers. According to
Medicare rate research, private insurance payments average 144.8 percent of cost while
Medicare payments average 86.6 percent of cost (Altarum Healthcare Value Hub, 2020). As a
result, cost shifting in hospital billings is often presumed to occur from public payers to private
payers
Research by Eldenberg and Kallapur (1996) found that hospitals will strategically change
their patient and service mix in order to garner maximum Medicare reimbursement. They
compared hospital revenues before and after 1983 when the Medicare payment system was
reformed. Previously, Medicare reimbursed hospitals for reported costs for all patient cases.
After 1983, Medicare’s reimbursement was based on inpatient or outpatient services, with
inpatient services charged as a fixed cost. The cost reimbursement reform provided an
opportunity for hospitals to reclassify services from an inpatient procedure into an outpatient
procedure even if an inpatient procedure would be the normal classification. Eldenberg and
Kallapur’s (1996) findings indicated that after the 1983 change, revenue from Medicare
outpatients had a rapid increase compared to non‐Medicare revenue and that outpatient cost
allocation also increased.
Eldenberg and Kallapur demonstrated how cost shifting systematically occurs at a
transactional level. However, a macro‐economic perspective explains why cost shifting may or
may not be a pervasive phenomenon. Similar to defense contractors, cost shifting is one of the
theories that underlies profit maximization among hospitals. This theory was articulated by
24

health economist Austin Frakt (2011) who conducted a comprehensive survey of hospital cost
shifting literature since 1996. In his survey, cost shifting was defined relative to hospital billing
where private payers are charged more in response to public payments shortfalls. One of the
cost shifting debates in public health policy is that as public health payments go down, private
payments go up. This notion implies a causality between the price charged for private and public
payers. In Frakt’s economic framework of cost shifting, he explains that cost‐shifting cannot
exist if hospitals already maximize profit. This is because hospitals who have exploited their
market power through price increases can no longer impose more increases before driving
insurers and customers away. Frakt concludes from this theoretical and empirical analysis that
cost shifting has occurred in hospitals at low levels. However, there are prevailing factors to
consider, such as market power and bargaining between hospitals and insurance providers that
also influence cost shifting phenomena. Frakt’s conclusion poses a similarity to defense
contractors, especially considering Weidenbaum’s (Bohi, 1973) and Wang and San Miguel’s
(2012) position that industry consolidation explained excessive profit.

Cost Shifting in Defense Contractor Studies
Academic literature suggests that the regulatory environment has potential implications
on cost shifting behavior. In Eldenberg and Kallapur findings, the 1983 enactment of Medicare
policy may have influenced how hospitals report patient mixes. In Pownall’s (1986) study on the
impact of cost regulation on shareholder wealth, cost shifting was seen as a potential reason for
establishing the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB). Pownall hypothesized that cost
accounting mechanisms allowed firms to report reimbursable costs to the government that
25

were not directly supportable or incurred by the contracted work. That the government paid for
a reported but unrelated cost can be difficult to verify, but there are plausible examples to
consider. In theory, a defense contractor may classify its operational expenses as defense‐
related and report the full cost incurred for reimbursement through its government contracts
while the commercial side benefits without bearing a proportionate cost. A defense contractor
may be motivated to so during times when government projects are funded compared to its
commercial business. Without standards to monitor cost shifting behavior, defense contractors
possess relative control over their cost reporting and have increased ability to extract cost
reimbursements from the government on both related and unrelated endeavors. The CASB can
limit contractors’ ability to cost shift, which enables the government to measure actual contract
costs. Through a number of standards that address the distinction of direct versus indirect costs,
allocation of indirect costs, accounting for tangible capital assets, and accounting for credits,
CASB governance strives for consistent cost reporting on government contracts (Code of Federal
Regulations, Title 48, Chapter 99).
In Pownall’s (1986) analysis, cost shifting is proxied through the shift from government
wealth to defense contractors’ shareholders. Wealth was measured as defense firms’ stock
returns relative to the NYSE index specifically before and after the enactment of cost regulation.
Findings show that the extent of cost shifting varied as the regulation developed. During 1968 to
1970, the CASB was formed in two phases. The first phase considered diligence procedures that
determined the need, scope, and feasibility of a regulatory body over uniform cost accounting
standards. The second phase created a legislative process to establish the CASB. Pownall found
that shareholder wealth decreased during the first phase of planning but increased during the
second phase of enactment. Pownall suggests that the stock market had initial, negative
26

reactions to the cost accounting restraints placed on defense contractors. In the second phase
however, market agents potentially anticipated increases in contractor profitability associated
with CASB events (Pownall, 1986).
Rogerson’s (1992) research theorizes that the regulatory process actually incentivizes
cost shifting among firms with commercial and defense segments due to two features: cost
sensitivity of defense products and cost accounting practices of defense contractors. In sole
source procurements, a defense contractor’s revenue from defense products is deemed cost
sensitive because prices are largely based on the product’s nominal cost. In contrast to
commercial products with competitively‐determined prices, commercial revenues are deemed
cost insensitive because the dollar‐for‐dollar product price does not necessarily rise and decline
in the same direction as production costs. A cost increase for commercial segments can lead to
decreases in profit where a cost increase for defense segments can lead to more reimbursement
from the government. Contractors calculate product costs that allocate a majority of costs in
relation to overhead labor instead of a direct charge to products (Rogerson, 1992). As a result,
contractors can strategically substitute labor for material costs between defense and
commercial alternatives. In theory if a firm knows that it can recognize more revenue in the
form of overhead costs allocated to defense contracts, then it will assign more labor from
commercial to defense projects to report higher costs incurred. It is important to recognize that
the firm is not actually overstating its overall expenditures. However, the firm is potentially
engaging in wasteful resource management at the government’s expense by over‐allocating
labor to defense contracts and under‐allocating labor to commercial business.
Thomas and Tung’s (1992) empirical findings on cost manipulation incentives also
suggest that when a firm has a mix of non‐government and government business, the costs
27

incurred by the non‐government segment are potentially sourced for cost shifting practices.
Thomas and Tung (1992) examined funding levels of defense contractors’ pensions relative to
defense revenue. They concluded that defense contractors tend to overfund their pensions
when their employees work on defense contracts. Specifically, the potential exists for defense
contractors to engage in certain pension overfunding strategies: “across‐contract” or “across‐
time.” Under the “across‐contract” strategy, contractors who maintain pension plans under
defense and non‐defense activities can transfer employees between plans, generating cost
reimbursements from defense contracts when employees are transferred to defense plans.
Under the “across‐time” strategy, contractors can manage pension plans by alternating the
timing when plans are operated under defense contracts and non‐defense business. Thomas
and Tung also found that there is less of an incentive to overfund pensions when a firm solely
contracts with the government.
Lichtenberg (1992) also studied non‐government and government segment data and
expands Rogerson’s and Thomas and Tung’s premise that if cost shifting occurs through
mechanisms like overhead allocation or pension overfunding, then cost shifting may be the
reason for government contractor profitability. This is because the shift of costs from a firm’s
commercial segment to its government segment results in lower commercial costs. A firm with
government and non‐government segments would therefore be more profitable compared to
an entirely non‐government firm even when the government‐oriented firm earns normal profits
on government business.
Conversely, McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002) examined profitability of government
contractors using segment data to hypothesize cost shifting but found no evidence to support
cost shifting as the cause. They instead attribute profitability to non‐accounting reasons, such as
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competition for defense contracts. McGowan and Vendrzyk hypothesized that within a mixed
segment comprising commercial and defense revenue, managers have more opportunities to
use accounting methods to allocate costs instead of across commercial or government
segments, especially in a low‐competition environment for defense contracts. They studied ROA
of mixed segments during two periods: 1984‐1989 when competition for defense contracts was
low, and 1994‐1998 when competition for defense contracts was high. During the low
competition period, government segments were more profitable than their mixed segment or
purely commercial segments. Further, no significant difference in profitability existsed between
“ranked” and “unranked” contractors. Ranked contractors are those who place among the Top
100 defense contractors and yield higher market power and influence over unranked
contractors not listed among the Top 100. During the highly competitive environment of 1994‐
1998, there was no significant difference in profit among mixed, government or commercial
segments. McGowan and Vendrzyk’s findings suggest that managers do not necessarily exploit
opportunities to shift costs onto government contracts to achieve profit.
Newer research extends Thomas and Tung’s “across contract” and “across time” cost
shifting strategies. Specifically, Chen and Gunny (2014) reviewed government contractor profit
relative to contract types. The different contracting mechanisms used by the DoD arguably lend
itself to cost shifting behavior. Further, cost shifting is exacerbated by the fact that the DoD does
not possess the same level of cost information as its contractors. Among the contract types that
exist in the federal acquisition environment, cost‐reimbursement type contracts may be more
advantageous to cost shifting. In particular, a cost‐type contract has an agreed‐upon target cost
plus a margin for the contractor’s profit and provisions for the government to reimburse the
contractor for allowable costs above the target. The government therefore bears more risk in a
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cost‐reimbursement scenario. Conversely, contractors bear the most risk on a fixed‐price
contract because the government and contractor agree on a pre‐determined price that the
government will pay regardless of the actual cost incurred by the contractor. Either contract
type can be used to acquire goods or services depending on the project, technological maturity,
and other factors. It is important to consider that there are immeasurable trades‐off between
the two contract types, even though cost‐type contracts can potentially garner more
reimbursement potential. Fixed‐price contracts can be more advantageous for contractors from
a revenue and cash collectability perspective. Since a fixed‐price contract generally has no price
adjustments compared to a cost‐type contract, government agencies can better forecast budget
and funding for a pre‐determined amount particularly in multi‐year contracts. The ability to plan
for funding in the future is especially critical during years when government spending levels face
congressional debate and the potential of being cut. Additionally, government contracts are
subject to audits under Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). A contract audit by the Defense
Contract Audit Agency can deem adjustments on costs that a contractor reports above the
agreed‐upon target in a cost‐reimbursement contract. The impact of regulatory monitoring is
also examined by Chen and Gunny in their study of government contractor profit.
Chen and Gunny’s sample consisted of publicly traded U.S. companies with federal
procurement contracts from 2005 to 2010, of which DoD agencies comprised approximately
69% of the tested sample. Expanding on Thomas and Tung’s “across‐contract” and “across‐time”
findings, Chen and Gunny first explore whether higher profit is observed in periods with cost‐
plus contracts compared to periods without cost‐plus contracts. Next, they explore whether
firms report more research and development costs (R&D) and selling, general, and
administrative expense (SG&A), during periods with a cost‐plus contract compared to periods
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without any cost‐plus contracts. Specifically, they exemplified a government contractor that
theoretically incurs $100 million in R&D expenses, of which $20 million relates to government
contracts and $80 million relates to the contractor’s commercial segment. Through its cost‐plus
contract, the contractor can report $25 million of reimbursable costs thereby shifting costs from
the commercial segment by $5 million. No matter how the costs are incurred, the contractor
reports R&D in the financial statements as a consolidated amount of $100 million. Due to
information asymmetry, the “across‐contract” hypothesis is therefore more challenging to
detect. The “across‐time” or “inter‐period” hypothesis however may be observed empirically.
Chen and Gunny suggest that contractors engage in more R&D and SG&A in years with a cost‐
plus contract compared to those without. Assuming the same $100 million in R&D expense of
which $20 million is incurred for the government, a contractor can increase R&D activities
beyond what is necessary, thereby benefitting its commercial business. Assuming the increased
costs amount to $5 million in additional costs, a total of $25 million in costs is reimbursed from
the government. The inter‐period hypothesis posits that the contractor will report $105 million
in the year with the cost‐plus contract and $100 million in the year without a cost‐plus contract.
Finally, Chen and Gunny test if there is a positive association between profitability and contracts
subject to cost regulation. The amount of required regulation ranges from full compliance to
modified coverage which requires compliance to subset of standards. As an example, full CAS
coverage would apply to contractor business units that have been awarded a contract of $50
million or more (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 48, Chapter 99). Chen and Gunny observe
that contractors’ profit increases during years with cost contracts and that contractors report
higher R&D and SG&A expenses during periods a contractor has a cost‐plus contract.
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Additionally, Chen and Gunny find that the implementation of regulatory standards mitigates
the relationship between cost plus contracts and profitability.
The cost shifting hypothesis implies that cost shifting is a one‐sided transaction
benefitting the contractor due to information asymmetry. It is notable to consider however that
governmental institutions, through the acquisition environment and bureaucratic process,
arguably permit such behavior. The conditions for cost shifting may continue to endure
especially when there is an incentive from the contractor and an opportunity provided by the
DoD.

Public Choice Application
Defense contractors’ financial performance and the hypothesis of cost shifting represent
outcomes that occur at the transactional, firm‐level but it is important to consider these topics
under public choice theory. Defense contractors are beneficiaries of federal acquisition
programs that are decided through a bureaucratic process. In academic and public discourse,
defense contractor profit, especially excessive profit, is associated with high public spending
that result in waste and inefficiencies on behalf of the government (Bohi, 1973). However, a
generally positive view on defense acquisitions is provided by Rich and Dews (1987) who
analyzed the history of defense acquisition reform under the traditional measures of cost,
schedule, and performance. Rich and Dews (1987) found that in the 1970’s and 1980’s, modest
success can be seen in lower cost growth of defense programs versus non‐defense programs,
less schedule slippage, an average of zero performance shortfalls with some exceptions, and
generally no increase in the length of the acquisition life cycle.
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Ultimately, without extensive reform on the defense acquisition and bureaucratic
process, waste from government spending may be inseparable from the public interest of
national security. Defense acquisition outcomes are part of a dynamic web of influences from
defense program managers, members of Congress, and the defense industry (Jackson, 2011).
Under a public choice paradigm, Dwight R. Lee shifts the focus away from criticizing government
waste and instead highlights that waste is actually inevitable. Lee illustrates why waste is found
and why attempting to reform a political process, such as military spending and the influence of
the military industrial complex, may have negative long run effects.
First, by nature of being a public good, consumers’ demand for defense is difficult to
ascertain in the same way that consumer preferences for private goods can be communicated in
the private marketplace. Generally, military spending is justified by citizens’ desire for security.
But the level of spending is shaped by organized interests between: 1) the political actors who
desire payoffs in gaining constituent support by way of providing military programs, and 2) the
suppliers of military programs.
Next, defense spending faces what Lee calls an “aroused versus apathetic public” that
describes a lack of monitoring and difficulty of measuring defense. Members of the “aroused
public” possess subjective feelings on whether defense should be increased or decreased.
However, these members do not necessarily act on a sentiment to put public interest ahead of
their own. Thus, the “aroused public” is not actually motivated to monitor military spending.
Members of the “apathetic public” possess feelings on pursuing the good of the country.
However, pursuing what is good for the country in terms of military spending will be difficult to
ascertain. To exemplify, the optimal measure of threats avoided or adversaries killed does not
directly translate to a quantitative measure of citizens’ level of security. Unlike a consumer
33

good, defense is something for which price and quantity are immeasurable on a supply and
demand curve. The complexities and ambiguities on behalf of the public consequently allows
the military industrial complex to dictate the scope and level of defense spending.
Lee further asserts that government waste is actually by the government’s own doing.
Procedures such as inaccurate cost estimating, cost shifting among contractors, and high
reliance on a few influential contractors result in inefficient and costly programs. The extent of
Congressional micromanagement of defense spending results in expensive programmatic
changes. This is because Congress is less motivated by efficient spending and more so by
political advantage.
Finally, the public’s inability to communicate its demand for defense is the fundamental
cause for waste. As a result, the military industrial complex will continue to produce what it is
engaged to do by the DoD which Lee argues will undeniably result in wasteful spending. In a
scenario where defense spending is curbed, those funding resources would be reallocated to
other goods for which spending is shaped by the special interest of political actors as previously
outlined. It is possible that waste is simply diverted from one program to another. Not only does
this pose a danger to national security, but the types of special interest groups and programs
where resources are allocated might not rise to the level of importance as the country’s
security. Although waste is an outcome of defense spending, the public good nature of defense
has a necessary place in society. Further, the military industrial complex remains an inseparable
and essential part of enabling the nation’s defense strategies.
Lee’s analytical framework provides an additional consideration to the profitability
observed in defense contractors. Because defense is a public good, the defense contractors who
supply the public good must generate sustainable, long‐term returns to support current and
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future defense programs. But as the supply and demand for defense is immeasurable, so is the
level of return or profit for the supplier, a defense contractor. At the minimum, a contractor’s
returns must match the cost incurred to produce the cost of goods sold to sustain operations.
Arguably, the requirement for break‐even or positive profit levels is inseparable from the
requirement for national defense.

Economic Moat, Competitive Advantage, and the DoD
The DoD’s defense strategies to outpace global rivals (DoD, 2018) demand that defense
contractors develop products and technologies for the DoD to assert its superiority. Defense
contractors must therefore raise and deploy capital towards research, investments, and
production of technically sophisticated defense products. Specific defense requirements also
entail contractors to face trade‐offs in deciding what to feasibly pursue, from a range of
products and services or a shift between defense and commercial business. In the example of a
new weapon system build, defense contractors must make capital investments to create a
prototypical design in hopes of winning a contract. Those who lose contracts face sunk costs
from capital outlays on the prototype. Those who are awarded contracts must make additional
investments towards production, which is possibly limited by the project’s funding levels. The
customization level for this weapon system also means that production capability may not be
immediately scalable to other defense or commercial projects. These contractors face
potentially large sunk costs for a relatively small production run of a highly sophisticated system.
Because of defense contractors’ operational environment in serving a unique customer,
the DoD, it is relevant to assess their capabilities that enable competitive advantage, known as
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economic moat. Companies that have sustained competitive advantage have built “moats” or
defenses that prevent or lessen competition, preserve profits, and create value without facing
threats from rivals. The practical application of moat in investment analysis is done by
Morningstar, which has a proprietary methodology of economic moat. To earn the Morningstar
Economic Moat Rating, a company must exhibit a trend of excess ROIC over WACC and also
demonstrate that it has attributes of competitive advantage (Collins, 2006; Kanuri and McLeod,
2016). To classify companies as wide moat, narrow moat, or no moat, Morningstar first reviews
the spread between a firm’s ROIC and its WACC. A historically positive spread between ROIC and
WACC generally indicates that a company earns superior returns, thereby creating value that
justifies economic moat. Morningstar’s determination of economic moat also considers
qualitative attributes. These attributes are intangible assets which prevent competitors from
replicating intellectual property; efficiency scale which represents a limited market being
efficiently served by one or very few companies; cost advantages that allow a firm to negotiate
terms; pricing power resulting from high customer switching costs; and network effect which
occurs when the value of a good or service increases as more people use that good or service
(Morningstar Investment Research Center). By Morningstar’s assessment, wide moat firms have
competitive advantages that last more than 20 years, narrow moat firms can fend off
competition for 10 years, and firms without moat have no competitive advantage and may
dissolve as a business.
As a trademark measure, Morningstar’s Economic Moat Rating is determined by a
selection review committee (Kanuri and McLeod, 2016). The exact mechanics are thus unknown.
Further, the academic literature on economic moat is scant and often limited to investment
analyst reports. However, the comparison of ROIC to a firm’s cost of capital, which is a
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fundamental measure of economic moat, has been articulated by Professor Aswath Damodaran
of New York University’s Stern School of Business. To determine whether a firm generates a
return from investments that exceeds the cost of funding the investments, the computed ROIC
should be compared to the cost of capital (Damodaran, 2007). Under this measurement, a firm
that generates excess returns on investments beyond the cost to raise capital will have share
prices that trade at a premium compared to firms without excess returns (Damodaran, 2007).
Academic studies on economic moat have mostly corroborated Morningstar’s position
that firms with economic moat earn superior shareholder returns and will outperform
competition. Of the few articles that address economic moat by Morningstar’s definition, the
majority have been published by David P. Boyd in the Journal of Business and Economics
Research. Boyd (2005) found that firms classified as wide moat outperformed the market using
the S&P 500 as a benchmark. Additionally, wide moat firms achieved high earnings, high
stability, and stock growth relative to the market (Boyd, 2005). Boyd and Quinn (2006) studied
Morningstar’s hypothesis that wide moat companies will realize price appreciation over a ten‐
year period. By studying share price appreciation of companies with moat and no‐moat
Morningstar ratings, they found that firms with moat status achieved higher returns over a ten‐
year period but not a five‐year period. Additionally, firms with moat had less share price
volatility than those with no moat (Boyd and Quinn, 2006). Boyd and Yilmaz (2008) further
studied moat under a paradigm of corporate stewardship. Motivated by mutual fund scandals,
Morningstar developed a stewardship letter system to grade companies’ corporate governance
practices (Boyd and Yilmaz, 2008). Using this measure of stewardship and the Institutional
Shareholder Services Corporate Governance Quotient, Boyd and Yilmaz (2008), found that there
was no relationship between stewardship measures and companies’ moat status.
37

Recent research by Kanuri and McLeod (2016) also studied the performance of
companies classified as wide moat by Morningstar. Over the period 2002 to 2014, wide moat
stocks annually outperformed the S&P 500 and Russell 3000 indices. During the financial crisis
period of 2007 to 2009, wide moat stocks realized less value compared to these benchmark
indices. Despite the relatively short time frame covered by economic moat studies and the few
published articles, a common finding is that Morningstar’s moat designation is consistent with
superior financial performance and increased shareholder value compared to market indices.
Since economic moat is rooted in the concept of competitive advantage, this research
has further sought literature in the area of strategic management. While a scholarly search on
economic moat renders few results, competitive advantage is among the main research areas in
strategic management. Features of Morningstar’s economic moat methodology can be traced to
Michael Porter’s view of competitive advantage. The first feature is Morningstar’s comparison of
ROIC to WACC. Porter (1980) established the five competitive forces that determine industry
profitability: potential entrants, buyers, substitutes, supplies, and industry competitors which
are collectively known as Porter’s Five Forces. Porter (1980) asserts that these five forces
determine a firm’s ability to earn average rates of return on investment in excess of the cost of
capital. Porter’s model does not explicitly express ROIC and WACC as the main determinants of
competitive advantage, but his assertion provides the framework that Morningstar has adopted
for their moat typology (Boyd, 2006).
Morningstar’s set of qualitative attributes that define economic moat is another area
that can be traced to Porter’s work. According to Porter (1980), there are three generic
strategies to outperform competitor firms in an industry: overall cost leadership, differentiation,
and focus. Cost leadership requires that firms control costs through functions like constructing
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efficient‐scale facilities, controlling overhead, avoiding marginal customers, and minimizing
operational costs. Differentiation can take many forms, such as a firm’s design and brand,
technology, customer service, and dealer network. Differentiation, especially across several
dimensions, creates brand loyalty by customers and thus lower price sensitivity. Focus can also
take many forms, but the focus strategy is built around serving a specific market such as a
particular buyer, group, product segment, or geography. Porter’s (1980) premise for this
strategy is that a narrow focus allows a firm to target its market effectively or efficiently. If
executed viably, these three strategies provide a firm with defenses to cope with the five
competitive forces and ultimately protect profits.

Summary of Literature Reviewed
Among the literature considered, there are various measurements and conclusions on
defense contractor performance. Often, the focus of defense contractors’ performance is
whether profits earned are unnecessarily high or concerningly low. Alternative explanations for
observed profit levels, such as industry consolidation, or risk and innovation, have been
introduced by recent research. However, it is still important for defense contractors to maintain
a strong industrial base to enable the DoD’s national security requirements.
The literature has also demonstrated systematic ways for contractors to influence profit.
Cost shifting in particular has been theoretically and empirically examined as an explanation for
defense contractor profits. With this method, contractors can execute tactics like billing
manipulations, allocations between expense types or between segments, or cost shifts “across‐
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time” or “across contract.” As a result, cost shifting potentially allows contractors to extract
higher reimbursements from the government.
Under public choice theory, defense contractor profit and even cost shifting are proxies
for wasteful government spending. Waste in government spending highlights potential
government failures, but additional focus should be placed on sources of waste. Lee
demonstrated how waste is inseparable from defense spending due to the public good nature of
defense, political coalitions, and the influence of special interest groups. As a public good, it is
difficult to measure the quantity and quality of defense demanded by the public. Accordingly, it
is subjective to assess whether contractors earn either excessive or inadequate profit. At the
minimum, contractors must earn a sufficient return to sustain operations to enable the DoD’s
national defense strategies.
Among the studies that scrutinize defense contractor financial performance, there is
generally a lack of DoD literature that assesses financial performance as economic profit. This
research adopts the concept of competitive advantage as a measure of economic profit.
Economic profit, proxied by economic moat, is superior to the current methods used in
literature because it considers both an accounting rate of return and an economic rate of return.
Defense contractor profit studies have primarily assessed accounting rates of return, but for this
metric to derive useful information, it must be compared to economic rates of return (Fisher
and McGowan, 1983).
The use of economic moat through Morningstar’s calculation of ROIC less WACC
addresses the literature gap of comparing accounting and economic rates of return to each
other. Virtually no academic studies exist that operationalize economic profit in the way this
research has done. Most studies on economic moat only corroborate Morningstar’s claim that
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moat status creates superior shareholder returns. However, Morningstar’s economic moat
methodology can be traced back to Porter’s Five Forces methodology which states that the five
competitive forces are the determinants of a firm’s ability to earn average rates of return on
investment in excess of the cost of capital (Porter, 1980).
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III. Methodology and Hypothesis Development

Overview
Chapter three covers the methodology to examine defense contractor performance
from a perspective of competitive advantage, known as economic moat. This section will
provide the calculations used to measure economic moat, develop hypothesis statements, and
introduce the theoretical model to test the hypotheses. For the empirical analysis, this section
will also go over the period of study, describe the data collection, and define the sample.

Measuring Economic Moat
To operationalize economic moat, certain variables must be considered that are not
typically discussed in defense contractor research. The referenced academic studies have mostly
used ROA as a proxy to measure defense contractor research (GAO, 1986; Lichtenberg, 1992;
Zhong and Gribbin, 2009; Wang and San Miguel, 2012; Chen and Gunny, 2014). ROA, which is a
firm’s net income divided by total assets, is a form of an accounting rate of return or accounting
profit since it is measured from explicitly reported items in a company’s financial statements.
Net income accounts for income (or loss) from operations and non‐operational items such as
taxes, interest expense or one‐time transactions such an extraordinary gain or loss.
Consequently, ROA is not the best portrayal of defense firms’ operational performance.
By contrast, there additional metrics that portray a firm’s operational performance as
well as opportunity costs. Specifically, Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) and Weighted Average
Cost of Capital (WACC) are proxies to analyze accounting rates of return and economic rates of
return, respectively. The following section will justify why ROIC less WACC represents economic
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moat. Drawing on financial literature, a firm’s ROIC provides a measure of the return earned
from capital investments relative to the capital provided toward that investment (Damodaran,
2007).
Figure 1 – ROIC Formula (Damodaran, 2007)

ROIC’s numerator uses after‐tax operating income which is calculated as a company’s
revenue less operational expenses and income taxes at time t. Operating income reflects a
company’s earnings (or loss) from its primary business activities and does not account for non‐
operational expenses as ROA does. Next, the denominator uses the book value instead of
market value of invested capital at time (t – 1). In financial accounting for a public firm, book
value reflects the stated value of a company’s assets, equity, and liabilities as recorded on its
balance sheet. In contrast, market value reflects a firm’s worth as measured by its publicly
traded stock price. For the purposes of ROIC, book value is used instead of market value because
book value is an objectively verifiable measure of a firm’s invested capital sources which
comprise debt (liabilities) and equity. Finally, there is a timing difference in the book value of
invested capital of (t – 1) compared to the after‐tax operating income at time t. The difference is
that capital investments made during the course of a year will not start generating income
immediately due to matters such as the start‐up of operations financed by the capital. As such,
invested capital at (t – 1) represents capital at the start of the year which serves as the divisor to
operating income earned for that year (Damodaran, 2007). Practically stated, ROIC provides a
measure of how much operating income a firm receives for every dollar of capital invested.
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The use of ROIC as an accounting metric is most insightful when compared to a firm’s
cost of capital (Damodaran, 2007). The cost of capital can be expressed as an opportunity cost.
This is because, in practice, firms must choose among alternative projects and feasible
investments. Further, firms incur some type of cost for financing needs, whether through
interest rates on loans and notes or through relinquishing partial firm ownership in exchange for
funding. Placing a value on these options requires the analysis of both implicit and explicit
measures, such as the opportunity cost of financing projects. The two main ways that firms
secure capital are stock issuance and loans (or credit) which are respectively reported on the
balance sheet as equity and debt. Of the two types of capital, the cost of debt is an explicit
measure because debt financing is normally secured through a note or credit line with stated
interest rates and terms. In contrast, the cost of equity is implicit because it is measured by the
firm’s market capitalization at a given period. The market capitalization is further adjusted for
risk factors such as the firm’s stock volatility relative to a broad stock market index. As such, the
cost of capital implicitly measures the rate of return that investors demand, which represents a
“cost” to the firm in the form of profit‐sharing, or dividends. Collectively, a firm’s creditors and
shareholders comprise its capital providers.
The cost of capital is represented in investment analyses and financial literature as the
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) and is represented in Figure 1.
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Figure 2 – Decomposition of WACC from the Corporate Finance Institute

In the WACC formula, a firm’s capital structure is weighted by the proportion of equity
and of debt. Considering these main sources of capital, WACC measures the hurdle rate
demanded by a firm’s capital providers in exchange for the capital provided. In particular, the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is applied which relates the required return on an
investment to the risk of that investment (Perold, 2004). To determine the cost of equity, the
CAPM requires the overall market’s risk premium and the stock’s beta relative to the market
(Perold, 2004). WACC as a singular measure does not necessarily specify whether the cost of
capital is too high or too low unless it is compared to relative measures. To derive value from its
meaning, WACC should be compared to ROIC because the relationship between the two rates
determines whether a firm is earning a return above its capital cost.
When applied as an economic rate of return, the WACC can be considered a minimum
rate of a return that a firm must earn to service capital costs. When a firm’s ROIC exceeds
WACC, this positive difference indicates that the firm is investing in projects that generate a
return above its capital cost, which can otherwise be described as economic moat. When ROIC is
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greater than WACC (i.e., positive economic profit), a firm possesses attributes that allow it to
meet the minimum hurdle rate and generate additional value (Morningstar; Collins, 2006).
When a firm’s ROIC is less than WACC (i.e., negative economic profit), the firm is possibly
engaging in projects that are non‐value added. Given the time horizon from when initial
investment occurs to when it starts to generate income, the difference between WACC and
ROIC should be evaluated over a long term.
It is important to note the distinction between the types of costs analyzed in the WACC
formulation and the types of cost analyzed in the defense cost shifting and profitability
literature. The referenced academic research has examined explicit operational costs such as
overhead, personnel, pensions, R&D, and SG&A. Since WACC represents an opportunity cost,
WACC is not a directly reported metric on defense contractors’ publicly available financial
statements. Instead, WACC is a proxy for the cost of capital raised.
Despite the distinction in costs analyzed, the variables of ROIC and WACC remain
relevant to the study of defense contractors. When a firm earns negative economic profit, the
provision of defense as a public good faces a threat if contractors decide to scale back on
defense projects or exit the defense industry altogether. In contrast, if economic profit is
positive, defense contractors generate value that may be placed towards defense research or
future defense projects. Therefore, understanding how certain attributes impact a defense
contractors’ economic provides insight on the factors that enable or pose a risk to contractors’
sustained competitive advantage.

46

Hypothesis Statements
The approach for developing hypothesis statements is examining defense contractors’
structural attributes that relate to economic moat. Since the concept of moat represents a firm’s
overall competitive advantage, moat is assessed at the firm level instead of a firm’s defense or
public sector segment, or business related to government sales.
The first topic to consider is whether a firm’s investment in intangible assets has a
significant association with economic moat. Contractors’ investments in intangible assets allow
them to protect defense research and innovations and also capitalize on valuable technologies.
The federal government even encourages maximum commercial use of inventions created
under government contracts (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 48, Chapter 1). Defense
contractors’ intellectual property portfolio can therefore be leveraged for future defense
business and even complement commercial business. Additionally, intangible assets are ways
for firms to keep competitors at bay because intangibles such as limited government permits
present a barrier to entry (Boyd, 2005).
Among the research reviewed, intangible assets have not been explicitly measured
as a predictor of defense contractor performance. However, Zhong and Gribbin’s findings on risk
one that proxied intangible assets as a measure of capital intensity. Specifically, their measure of
risk was intangible assets and property, plant, and equipment scaled by total sales. This
reasoning was aligned with the DoD profit policy which acknowledges that risk factors for
defense contractors are their capital investments (Zhong and Gribbin; DFAIR, 1985, VI).
Leveraging Zhong and Gribbin’s measure of capital intensity, a firm’s intangible asset attribute
can be measured as net intangible assets (less Goodwill) scaled by total sales. This calculation
appropriately measures a firm’s intangible asset attribute because capital intensity considers the
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level of intangibles to employ to order to generate a dollar of revenue. Since defense firms’
intellectual property can be utilized in defense and commercial applications and potentially bars
competitors, intellectual property is predicted to have a positive association with moat. The first
hypothesis is as follows:
H1:

Defense contractors’ intangible asset investments are positively related to economic
moat, all else held constant.

The next second topic to consider is whether defense contractors’ efficiency scale is
associated with economic moat. A critique on the military acquisition process suggested that
enabling the defense industrial base to produce efficiently will achieve the necessary
improvements that meet future objectives (Rich and Dews, 1987). The defense industry
characterizes efficiency scale because it serves a limited market, the DoD, whose requirements
are produced by a concentration of a few large companies. Specifically, the DoD’s prime
contractors of Lockheed Martin Corporation, The Boeing Company, General Dynamics
Corporation, Raytheon Company (pre‐merger), Northrup Grumman Corporation, and United
Technologies Corporation are the few companies who historically comprise the top contractor
positions by obligation amount according to the U.S. federal government Top 100 Contractors
reports (GSA, 2019). Efficiency scale can also be conceptualized from Wang and San Miguel’s
(2012) defense industry consolidation findings as fewer firms result in a less fragmented
industry.
Efficiency scale is also a metric not normally conducted for testing in defense contractor
performance. However, investment analytics look to ratios of Fixed Asset Turnover and Total
Asset Turnover as measures of firm efficiency (Morningstar Investment Research Center). Fixed
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Asset Turnover, calculated as revenue divided by average property, plant, and equipment, is an
indicator of productivity levels as it measures how effective a firm is at generating sales from its
fixed assets. Total Asset Turnover, calculated as revenue divided by average total assets, is a
“catch‐all” efficiency ratio (Morningstar Investment Research Center) that highlights
management’s effectiveness in using both short‐term and long‐term assets. In particular, the
Total Asset Ratio would be an appropriate efficiency measure for contractors like service firms
that do not require the same plant asset infrastructure as manufacturing firms. Generally, the
higher ratio, the better. The ability to successfully invest in capital‐intensive assets also presents
a barrier to market entry for smaller producers. The second hypothesis is as follows:
H2:

A defense contractors’ asset base positively explains economic moat, all else
held constant.

The third topic to be considered is whether cost advantages and pricing power explain
defense firms’ economic moat. These two attributes are not mutually exclusive and can be
considered together within the defense contracting environment. Of the economic moat
attributes considered, cost advantages and pricing power are areas where cost shifting can
theoretically influence profit. Due to externalities, this test is not conducted to empirically
observe cost shifting. However, this section will describe the motivations for analyzing certain
variables that influence contractor performance.
In government acquisitions, cost‐type contracts place a higher risk level on the
government to reimburse potential cost overruns which can impact contractors’ profit margins
on programs acquired under cost‐type contracts. In fact, in the 1960’s the Office of the
Secretary of Defense discouraged cost‐type contracts in favor of fixed‐price and incentive
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contracts as a way to gain more control over government costs (Fox, 2011). Another dynamic of
defense acquisitions is that the government cannot easily switch among alternative firms when
costs increase due to limited firm options, especially providers that produce specialized
weapons systems. Effectively, defense contractors exert a level of pricing power and cost
advantage as they can raise the price paid by the government without losing the government as
a customer. For example, the government does not have an easily substitutable provider for
Lockheed Martin’s Joint Strike Fighter as it would have a replacement for a commodity like
office chairs. The government might deem it more feasible to pay price increases imposed by
the contractor instead of finding another provider.
Thomas and Tung (1992) and Chen and Gunny (2014) suggested that contract types are
mechanisms for reporting higher reimbursable costs to the government which influences higher
profit levels. Among the contract options, cost‐type contracts in particular are assumed to exert
more pricing power due to their reimbursement nature. In contrast, fixed‐price contracts are
assumed to possess low pricing power because the DoD’s price will not change based on the
contractor’s cost incurred. This test of hypothesis predicts that cost contracts will have a
positive association with moat.
H3:

Cost‐type contracts positively impact economic moat, all else held constant.

The final hypothesis test relates to another cost shifting premise. Lichtenberg (1992)
suggested that the relationship between profit and a firm’s percentage of government sales to
total sales is a positive linear function, which highlights an important consideration. A firm’s
reported government sales is agnostic with regards to contracting types because transactions
occur through other mechanisms like sales orders, blanket purchase agreements, and
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government purchase cards, for example. As a result, a firm’s total sales attributed to
government business must also be accounted for. The fourth hypothesis statement is as follows:
H4:

Revenue from government sales is positively associated with economic moat, all
else held constant.

Model Design and Variables of Interest
The dependent variable for the hypothesis tests is Moat which is a proxy for a firm’s
competitive advantage, or ability to receive returns above capital costs. Moat is measured as
ROIC less WACC. To examine the effect of moat attributes, the main independent variables are
as follows: Intangible Assets calculated as intangible assets less Goodwill divided by total sales;
Fixed Asset Turnover calculated as total revenue divided by average property, plant, &
equipment; Total Asset Turnover calculated as total revenue divided by average total assets;
Cost Contracts % which is a percentage of firm’s total sales attributed cost type government
contracts; and Defense Sales % which is a percentage of a firm’s total sales attributed to defense
revenue. A summary of variables is outlined in Table 2 along with descriptive statistics in Table
4.
Control variables of firm size, industry, and time have also been considered to separate
the effects of confounding data. McGahan and Porter (1997) highlighted the influence of year,
industry, and business‐specific effects on U.S. corporate profits. Research on corporate
performance also suggests firm size and industry as effect variables due to different growth
opportunities and complexity (Core et al, 1999). These findings are particularly applicable to the
study of defense contractors who represent a diverse range of company sizes and industries,
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from heavy construction providers, prescription druggists, and aircraft manufacturers to name a
few. Additionally, the ability for the DoD to engage contract work depends on an ever‐evolving
budgetary environment subject to fluctuations over time. To control for firm size, Total Sales will
be selected as a proxy. To control for firm industry, the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
will be selected as a proxy. Finally, the final control considered is time, which is represented by
Year. Table 2 summarizes the theoretical model along with variable descriptions.
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Table 2 – Theoretical Model & Variable Descriptions
Theoretical Model
Moat it = β 0 + β 1 Intangible Assets it + β 2 Fixed Asset Turnover it + β 3 Total Asset Turnover it
+ β 4 Cost Contracts % it + β 5 Defense Sales% it + β 6 Total Salesit + β 7 SIC it + β 8 Year it + ε
Variable

Role

it

Description
Calculated as ROIC less WACC. Measures firm i 's ability to receive a return from operations
above its capital cost at time t . Represents competitive advantage.

Moatit

Dependent Variable

ROIC it

Calculates DV

Return on invested capital for firm i at time t . Measures the return earned from capital
investments relative to the capital provided toward that investment.

WACC it

Calculates DV

Weighed average cost of capital for firm i at time t . Represents economic rate of return.
Measures a firm's hurdle rate required by capital providers in exchange for capital provided.

Intangible Assetsit

Proxy for intangible assets

Measured as intangible assets less Goodwill divided by total sales for firm i at time t .

Fixed Asset Turnoverit

Proxy for efficiency scale

Measured as total sales divided by avg. property, plant, & equipment for firm i at time t .

Total Asset Turnoverit

Proxy for efficiency scale

Measured as total sales divided by avg. total assets for firm i at time t .

Cost Contracts %it

Proxy for cost advantage &
pricing power

Measured as percentage of total sales attributed to cost type government contracts for firm i
at time t .

Defense Sales % it

Proxy for cost advantage &
pricing power

Measured as percentage of total sales attributed to defense sales for firm i at time t .

Total Salesit

Control Variable

Measured as total annual sales for firm i at time t

SICit

Control Variable

Measured as one of ten dummy variables represented by the first two SIC digits for firm i at
time t

Yearit

Control Variable

Measured as one of nine dummy variables representing each year from 2010‐2019 for firm i at
time t

εit

Error Term

Unobservable error term for firm i at time t

Coefficient of Interest

Predicted
Relationship

β1

+

H1 explores the relationship between defense contractors’ intangible asset investments and
economic moat

β2 ; β3

+

H2 explores the relationship between defense contractors’ asset base (efficiency scale) and
economic moat

β4

+

H3 explores the relationship between cost‐type contracts and economic moat

β5

+

H4 explores the relationship between a firm's total revenue attributed to defense sales and
economic moat

Hypothesis Test
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Period of Study
The period of study is from 2010‐2019 which has been chosen due to global market
anomalies that occurred prior to this period. The calculation of economic profit, particularly
WACC, is impacted by external factors such as the corporate lending environment and stock
market volatility. From approximately 2007‐2009, world financial markets were undergoing a
historic crisis, which was followed by severe credit shock for global companies (Campello et al.,
2010). In a study of how firms managed liquidity during the 2008‐2009 period, Campello et al.
concluded that when firms are unable to access credit lines, firms choose between saving or
investing during a crisis. An implication from their study is that the ability to continue capital
investments depends in part by access to credit sources for liquidity. As such, the credit shock
during 2008‐2009 may be a limiting factor on the level of capital investments made by firms
compared to a non‐crisis period.
Stock market volatility also impacts capital investments. Stock investors who anticipate
losses during a crisis tend to make fewer new investments and will either withdraw, hold their
positions, or shift to less risky assets. According to the Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) Index,
lower trading volume was observed during volatile periods around 1990’s to early 2000 and
2006‐2007 as indicated in Figure 2. The S&P 500 Index is benchmarked for market performance
because 80% of available market capitalization is represented by the 500 large‐cap U.S. equities
comprising this index (S&P Global). The period of 2010‐2019 provides the appropriate historical
framework due to market growth and stability.
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Figure 3 – S&P 500 Weighted Index from 1994 to 2020 obtained from Yahoo! Finance

Data Collection and Sample Description
The defense contractors identified for the sample population were obtained from the
2010‐2019 annual Top 100 Contractors Reports containing top U.S. federal government
contractors by federal agency and by obligation amount. The Top 100 Contractors (“Top 100”) is
made available through the federal government’s System for Award Management website; this
website provides publicly available acquisition award data that enables analyses on the impacts
of federal spending and acquisition policies (GSA, 2019). Accordingly, the Top 100 reports are
deemed a reliable basis from which to select contractors most significant to the study of
defense contractor profitability. The following inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied to
select the sample population.
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Table 3 – Inclusion & Exclusion Criteria
No. Parameter

Inclusion Criteria

Exclusion Criteria

1.

Study Period

2010 to 2019

Periods before 2010 and after 2019

2.

Contractor Type

Listed in the U.S federal government Top 100
Contractors Report

3.

Firm Type

Publicly traded companies based in the United States

Not listed in the U.S federal government Top 100
Contractors Report
Private companies, international‐based companies, non‐
profit organizations, educational institutions

4.

Financial Data

Publicly available income statement and balance sheet
data from 10‐K reports; historical stock prices and stock
Delisted companies whose income statement, balance
beta from Yahoo!; risk‐free bond yields from U.S.
sheet, and financial ratios are not available from 10‐K,
Department of the Treasury; financial ratios from
Morningstar, and Yahoo!
Morningstar; corporate finance valuation data from
NYU. Data must be reported as a nominal value or ratio.

5.

Periods

Five or more consecutive years during Study Period

Four or less consecutive years during Study Period

The first criterion ensures that a period of market stability was analyzed. The second
criterion ensures that only firms incurring defense business are included. These initial criteria
resulted in 100 contractors over 10 years, or 1,000 firm‐year observations. The third and fourth
criteria ensure that sufficient data exists for ROIC and WACC variables to be determined. These
exclusions eliminated a substantial portion of contractors such as privately held companies,
educational institutions, private equity firms, and international corporations. The remaining
contractors were 38 public‐listed U.S. firms.
During the selection process for defense contractors, it was noted that a number of
firms had undergone mergers or acquisitions (M&A) during the 2010‐2019 period. For example,
Raytheon Company appeared annually in the Top 100 contractor reports and ranked among the
top five obligation amounts. In April of 2020, Raytheon Company completed its merger with
United Technologies Corporation to form Raytheon Technologies. Due to the defunct status of
its previous ticker, RTN, Raytheon Company’s certain data necessary for this analysis were
inaccessible through the investment research databases consulted such as Morningstar
Investment Research Database which reports the metric ROIC.
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There were additional observations of M&A activity of candidate firms. Health Net Inc.
appeared annually in the Top 100 report until 2016 when it was acquired by Centene
Corporation at which time Centene Corporation replaced Health Net Inc.’s position in the
report. Harris Corporation and L3 Technologies Inc. each appeared annually in the Top 100
report through 2018. In 2019, Harris Corporation completed its merger with L3 Technologies Inc.
to create L3Harris Technologies. L3Harris Technologies replaced Harris Corporation and L3
Technologies Inc’s positions in the Top 100 list as of 2019. Due to the third and fourth criteria,
the number of candidate firms with actively‐traded ticker symbols was reduced to 35 firms.
The fifth criterion ensures that there is sufficient historical data to derive valuable
meaning from economic moat. The five‐year consecutive period is motivated by Morningstar’s
economic moat principle which explains that over a five‐year period, wide moat stocks (those
with sustainable competitive advantage) will generate shareholder value through increased
earnings power and price appreciation. Due to this criterion, the number of candidate firms was
reduced to 30 contractors. Table 8 provides a listing of the firms that were included in the final
sample detailed by firm‐year observation and SIC.
It was considered whether a form of data normalization should be performed to
account for the unbalanced nature resulting from M&A activity. However, because the variables
of interest are percentages, they are effectively scaled. It was also noted that M&A activity
occurred across diverse industries of manufacturing, healthcare, and information technology
and can be deemed a standard occurrence in the normal course of business. Further, these
mergers potentially mirror the moat characteristic of efficiency scale through industry
consolidation.
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Data Limitations and Sample Size
A major limitation was the accessibility of financial data which could be facilitated
through the use of a broader databank such as Bloomberg or Compustat. The financial metrics
used in this analysis were manually obtained from publicly available sources such as the SEC
website or Morningstar’s research database. Additionally, different fiscal years among firms
posed a limiting factor because this impacted availability of historical ratios. Morningstar
Investment Research Database reports ten years of historical data, going back from a firm’s
most recently reported 10‐K. At the time of this analysis, some firms have already published
their 2020 fiscal year statements which means that historical data in Morningstar would be
available from 2011 through 2020, eliminating the 2010 observation. Although some ratios like
ROIC may be independently calculated, Morningstar’s database provided a consistent,
investment‐grade calculation of this variable. Due to unavailable, missing, or non‐reported
financial data, the final sample consisted of 30 contractors and 274 contractor‐year
observations. The attached appendix describes the list of selected contractors by name and
industry.
Another limitation in this study is the manual calculation of WACC which is not a metric
reported by companies or research databases. Using the relevant financial information from the
referenced sources, the data input and calculation for WACC was manually performed for each
individual firm‐year observation. Results were verified against a WACC calculator using online
sources from Professor Damodaran at NYU’s Stern School of Business.
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Panel Data Analysis
The analysis of defense contractors’ economic moat over time appropriately describes
the sample as a panel dataset. Due to a number of yearly observations not reported for certain
contractors, the sample analyzed is an unbalanced panel. When applying a pooled‐cross section
regression model to panel data, the dataset is treated as a cross‐section dataset and the error
term is idiosyncratic for each observation. Alternatively, panel analysis assumes the error term
has two components: 1) a time‐invariant component that is different for each company but that
does vary over time for the same company; and 2) a time‐variant component (i.e., idiosyncratic)
that is different for each company during each time period. When the time‐invariant component
of the error term is assumed to correlated with the independent variables, a fixed‐effect model
can be used to account for this violation of exogeneity. The fixed‐effects model effectively
removes the time‐invariant component from the error term. A fixed‐effects panel model will
thus be selected to conduct the tests of hypotheses.

Summary
Chapter three covered the methodology to analyze defense contractor performance. In
particular, the variables of ROIC and WACC were described as an accounting rate of return and
economic rate of return, respectively. The difference between these two rates can
operationalize the concept of economic moat, or competitive advantage. Four hypothesis
statements were developed to examine defense contractors’ attributes of economic moat,
which are intangible asset investments, efficiency scale, cost advantages, and pricing power. As
a result of the methodology and hypothesis development, a theoretical fixed‐effects model for
panel data was selected.
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IV. Analysis and Results

Overview
Chapter four summarizes the analysis and results of this study. First, descriptive
statistics of the sample will be presented. Next, a regression using a fixed‐effects panel model
will be conducted. Finally, the regression results will be outlined to identify significant attributes
that impact defense contractors’ economic moat.

Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 displays descriptive statistics of the variables considered. Two sample sets are
presented: N = 274, referred to as the “initial sample,” and N = 136, referred to as the “subset.”
The difference between the initial sample and subset is as follows. The initial sample of N = 274
represents the set of contractor‐year observations resulting from the inclusion and exclusion
criteria outlined in Table 3. In order to conduct tests of hypothesis, specifically H3 and H4, using
the variables listed in Table 2, additional data was collected to obtain firm sales attributed to
government cost type contracts (variable Cost Contracts %) and sales attributed to defense
customers (variable Defense Sales %).
Of the 30 defense contractors in the initial sample, 16 defense firms reported cost
contract sales and defense sales, resulting in an unbalanced panel data set of N = 136
contractor‐year observations. The final model was conducted on the subset of N = 136 because
this subset of data possessed all variables to test the theoretical model. However, some metrics
may not be considered valid measures for measuring a firm’s economic moat due to different
financial reporting requirements and features of the federal acquisitions process that are not
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applicable across all defense contractors. To account for these differences, a sensitivity analysis
will also be conducted on which results will be discussed below. A list of the firm‐year
observations for the initial sample of N = 274 and N = 136 subset have been outlined in Table 7.

Table 4 – Descriptive Statistics
N = 274
MOAT %
ROIC %
WACC %
Intangible Assets %
Fixed Asset Turnover
Total Asset Turnover
Total Sales $
N = 136
MOAT %
ROIC %
WACC %
Intangible Assets %
Fixed Asset Turnover
Total Asset Turnover
Defense Sales %
Defense Sales $
Cost Contracts %
Total Sales $

Mean

Median

0.04
0.12
0.07
0.05
32.14
1.61
35,334,439,657

0.04
0.11
0.07
0.04
17.27
1.23
12,863,284,000

Mean

Median

0.07
0.15
0.07
0.06
32.38
1.28
0.63
10,623,460,735
0.49
22,244,616,390

0.06
0.13
0.07
0.04
19.03
1.14
0.75
5,171,373,680
0.48
9,534,500,000
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Min
‐0.78
‐0.68
0.01
0
1.60
0.19
588,430,000
Min
‐0.20
‐0.11
0.02
0
3.21
0.53
0.09
327,800,000
0.02
1,107,709,000

Max

Std Dev

0.75
0.85
0.13
0.46
328.17
5.91
214,000,000,000

0.12
0.12
0.02
0.06
40.98
1.06
45,788,268,658

Max

Std Dev

0.75
0.85
0.12
0.40
328.17
2.73
1.00
42,425,000,000
0.99
101,127,000,000

0.13
0.13
0.02
0.07
45.15
0.46
0.33
11,521,205,883
0.23
25,304,154,462

Tests of Hypotheses
Regression analysis was conducted using the RStudio “plm” package. A “twoway” fixed‐
effects model was employed to account for potentially significant effects for time and individual
firms. A significance level of α = 0.05 was chosen to determine statistical significance of the
parameter estimates and overall model, however other significance levels were considered for
potential implications. The final model is specified as follows:
Moatit = β1 Intangible Assetsit + β2 Fixed Asset Turnoverit
+ β3 Total Asset Turnover %it + β4 Cost Contracts %it
+ β5 Defense Sales%it + ε it
Prior to interpreting results, additional diagnostic tests were performed to evaluate the
validity of the model estimates. Because the panel data covers observations over a 10‐year
period, a possible problem that may be encountered is autocorrelation, which occurs when the
error term in a given period is in some way correlated with the previous period (Hilmer and
Hilmer, 2014). Another issue that may arise is heteroskedasticity which occurs when the error
terms have nonconstant variance (Hilmer and Hilmer, 2014). The implications of the presence of
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are that the parameter estimates are unbiased, they do
not have minimum variance among all unbiased estimators, and the standard errors and
associated calculations are incorrect (Hilmer and Hilmer, 2014). To detect autocorrelation, the
Breusch‐Godfrey test for serial correlation was employed for each of the models. To detect the
presence of heteroskedasticity, the Breusch‐Pagan test was employed for each of the models.
As a result of the diagnostics, no additional corrections were necessary to refine the regression’s
parameter estimates. The regression results for the final model are summarized in Table 5.
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Table 5 – Final Model Summary
Final Model: Fixed‐Effect Panel Model

Moat it = β 1 Intangible Assets it + β 2 Fixed Asset Turnover it + β 3 Total Asset Turnover % it
+ β 4 Cost Contracts % it + β 5 Defense Sales% it + ε it
Unbalanced Panel: n = 16, T = 3‐10, N = 136
Residuals:
Minimum
‐0.1991269
1st Quartile ‐0.0295961
Median
0.0003804
3rd Quartile 0.0253604
Maximum
0.3764404

Total Sum of Squares:
Residual Sum of Squares:
R‐Squared:
Adj. R‐Squared:
F‐statistic:
p‐value:
Breusch‐Godfrey Test:
Breusch‐Pagan Test:

0.75346
0.6079
0.19318
‐0.027549
5.07612 on 5 and 106 DF
0.00032755
Fail to reject
Fail to reject

Dependent Variable:

Moat

it

Predicted
Relationship

Observed
Relationship

Coefficient

t‐value

p‐value

Intangible Assets it

+

‐

‐0.37420780

‐1.8282

0.070333

Fixed Asset Turnover it
Total Asset Turnover it
Cost Contracts % it
Defense Sales % it

+

+

0.00017262

0.5332

0.595042

+

+

0.13983210

3.3016

+

‐

‐0.06445280

‐0.5704

0.569615

+

+

0.00203764

0.0193

0.984646

Independent Variables

.

0.001311 **

. Significant at the 0.10 level
** Significant at the 0.01 level

Coefficient of Interest

β1

Hypothesis Tested & Conclusion
H1 explores the relationship between defense contractors’ intangible asset investments and economic
moat. At α = 0.10, the coefficient is statistically significant. The negative sign indicates that moat is
negatively impacted by the scaled measure of intangible assets.

β2 ; β3

H2 explores the relationship between defense contractors’ asset base (efficiency scale) and economic
moat. Fixed Asset Turnover is not statistically significant. Total Asset Turnover is statistically significant at
α = 0.01. The coefficient is positively associated with economic moat as predicted.

β4

H3 explores the relationship between cost‐type contracts and economic moat. The parameter estimate is
not statistically significant; H3 is rejected.

β5

H4 explores the relationship between a firm's total revenue attributed to defense sales and economic
moat. The parameter estimate is not statistically significant; H4 is rejected.
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Panel Model Regression Results
The final model was conducted on the sample subset of N = 136 and was statistically
significant at the α = 0.05 level. It was noted that the model had a relatively low R‐Squared of
0.19318 which indicates there is a high level of unexplained variation in the model. Given the
novelty of the effect variable examined, it is unknown whether there is an acceptable standard
of R‐squared measures if comparable studies were conducted. This subset of data mainly
comprised of contractors in the aircraft manufacturing, aeronautics, construction, and
professional services industries. The model produced two statistically significant results:
Intangible Assets with a negative parameter estimate of ‐0.3742078 significant at the 0.10 level;
and Total Asset Turnover with a positive parameter estimate of 0.1398321 significant at the 0.01
level. The variables Cost Contract % and Defense Sales % which proxied cost advantages and
pricing power were not found to be statistically significant.
The Intangible Assets results relate to the first test of hypothesis recalled here:
H1:

Defense contractors’ intangible asset investments are positively related to
economic moat, all else held constant.

The predicted effect was positive under the assumption that intangible asset investments
position contractors to protect their intellectual property and even capitalize on their portfolio
for commercial use. The observed negative effect suggests that a firm’s intangible asset
portfolio may not be a value‐add to the firm’s competitive advantage. A possible consideration
is that contractors’ intangible assets, such as patents developed from highly specialized defense
technologies, have a very limited commercial application.
The Intangible Assets results can also be related back to Zhong and Gribbin’s finding on
risk and profitability which used a similar capital intensity measure of intangible assets and net
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property, plant, and equipment scaled by total sales where this study only uses intangible assets
in the numerator. Zhong and Gribbin’s analysis show that when intangible assets and plant
assets are scaled together, the effect is positive on profit. However, this study shows that
intangible assets may be an impediment to competitive advantage. An implication can be that
the capital intensities of intangible assets and plant assets have different effects on defense
contractor performance and should therefore be analyzed separately.
The Total Asset Turnover results related to the first test of hypothesis which is recalled
here:
H2:

A defense contractors’ asset base positively explains economic moat, all else
held constant.

The predicted effect was positive under the assumption that defense contractors can gain
efficiencies by serving a limited defense market and that their capital‐intensive asset base
presents a barrier to market entry for smaller firms. Two variables were analyzed to study the
effect: Fixed Asset Turnover, with no statistically significant results on a positive coefficient, and
Total Asset turnover with statistically significant results on a positive coefficient. This finding
suggests that there is no significant effect on economic moat from sales generated by the use of
property, plant, and equipment. However, when considering a firm’s entire asset ownership,
including plant assets, intangible assets, and short‐term assets, defense contractors do possess
the efficiency scale that positively impacts competitive advantage.
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Sensitivity Analysis – Initial Sample
The analysis conducted for the final model included variables that are not necessarily
relevant across all defense contractors based on certain criteria. First, public corporations are
required to report government sales figures when they represent 10 percent or more of annual
total sales (FASB, 1979). The firms that did not report government sales data in their public
financial statements were primarily courier and healthcare companies such as FedEx, Cardinal
Health, and Centene Corporation whose businesses do not specifically specialize in the defense
industry and whose offerings serve a diverse customer base. The DoD may not represent a
significant customer in terms of sales amounts, but these companies are significant to the DoD
in terms of obligation amounts. Additionally, federal acquisition contracts that are typically used
in weapon system programs are not always applicable to all categories of firms. For example,
the healthcare and courier firms described qualify as Top 100 DoD contractors, but their
products and services offerings are inherently different from traditional defense products.
Therefore, features such as cost‐reimbursement contracts are not considered normal
acquisition mechanisms. To account for these differences, the effect of Cost Contracts % and
Defense Sales % were removed from the final model to test H1 and H2. A sensitivity analysis was
then conducted on the initial sample of N = 274 through an fixed‐effects panel model
regression. Results are summarized in Table 6.

66

Table 6 – Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity Analysis: Fixed‐Effect Panel Model

Moat it = β 1 Intangible Assets it + β 2 Fixed Asset Turnover it + β 3 Total Asset Turnover % it + ε
Unbalanced Panel: n = 30, T = 6‐10, N = 274
Residuals:
Minimum
‐0.7145760
1st Quartile ‐0.0271744
Median
0.0065877
3rd Quartile 0.0348151
Maximum
0.4044664

Total Sum of Squares:
Residual Sum of Squares:
R‐Squared:
Adj. R‐Squared:
F‐statistic:
p‐value:
Breusch‐Godfrey Test:
Breusch‐Pagan Test:

1.93
1.8253
0.054267
‐0.11287
4.43749 on 3 and 232 DF
0.004697
Fail to reject
Fail to reject

Dependent Variable:

Independent Variables

Predicted
Relationship

it

Moat

Observed
Relationship

Coefficient

it

t‐value p‐value

Intangible Assets it

+

‐

‐0.14917732

‐0.9470

0.34461

Fixed Asset Turnover it
Total Asset Turnover it

+

+

0.00010018

0.2919

0.77064

+

+

0.07709043

3.0373

0.00266

**

** Significant at the 0.01 level
Coefficient of Interest

β1

β2 ; β3

Hypothesis Tested & Conclusion
H1 explores the relationship between defense contractors’ intangible asset investments and economic
moat. At α = 0.10, the coefficient is statistically significant. The parameter estimate is not statistically
significant; H1 is rejected.
H2 explores the relationship between defense contractors’ asset base (efficiency scale) and economic
moat. Fixed Asset Turnover is not statistically significant. Total Asset Turnover is statistically significant at
α = 0.01. The coefficient is positively associated with economic moat as predicted.

The regression results for the sensitivity analysis only indicates one statistically
significant variable, Total Asset Turnover, with a positive effect. This result suggests that even
over a broader set of industries, defense contractors consistently possess the efficiency
attributes in their total asset base to positively influence competitive advantage.
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Summary of Results
Panel data analysis was conducted to examine each attribute’s relationship with
defense contractors’ economic moat. The empirical evidence produced two statistically
significant results: intangible assets investments were found to be negatively associated with
economic moat while efficiency scale was found to be positively associated with economic
moat. Neither cost advantages nor pricing power indicated statistically significant relationships.
An implication from this finding is that defense contractors’ structural asset base is a potential
driver in sustained competitive advantage which is a critical element for the Department of
Defense to advance its national defense strategies.
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V. Conclusions
This thesis conducted exploratory research on defense contractors’ financial
performance using economic profit. Specifically, a measure of competitive advantage, known as
economic moat, was proxied as economic profit. Defense contractor performance is often
scrutinized in literature under various measures of accounting rates of return to measure profit.
However, the formulation of economic moat as ROIC less WACC addresses the literature gap of
comparing accounting rates of return to economic rates of return. The understanding of defense
contractors’ economic moat provides a novel view on identifying competitive advantage
attributes that enable long term, sustainable operations to maintain a necessary industrial base
for the provision of national security. Specifically, the empirical analysis sought to understand
how economic moat is impacted by the intangible asset investments that defense contractors
make, whether defense contractors have efficiency and productivity measures to positively
influence economic moat, and whether moat differs depending on the type of defense contracts
held or the amount of defense sales recognized.
Statistically significant results were observed which suggest that defense contractors’
investment in intangible assets are negatively associated with economic moat. However, when
considering contractors’ total asset base to include intangible assets, plant assets, and short‐
term assets, contractors possess the structural defense that generate sufficient returns to
sustain competitive advantage.
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Future Research
The study of defense contractor performance may benefit in the following ways.
Although academic literate suggests the study of accounting rates of return relative to economic
rate of return, a plausible analysis would be to examine if either rate is impacted more so by
certain attributes. As such, economic moat attributes can be studied against ROIC and WACC
individually. Rogerson’s study found that positive economic profit in the form of increased
market value for prime contract award winners. Following this notion, it is reasonable to
consider that firms awarded with government contracts, either cost reimbursement or fixed
price, can expect higher share prices, especially if shareholders perceive additional value in the
government or defense business segment of a firm. Higher share prices have the ability to
increase a firm’s WACC because a higher return is demanded by shareholders which increases a
firm’s hurdle rate to service its capital providers.
Future research can conduct similar analyses by expanding the sample size. In particular,
System of Award Management is a publicly available government database which reports
historical government contracting detail. Some financial metrics such as revenue attributed to
certain contract types were not consistently reported among contractors, however the use of a
federal database may expand the data availability to explore more criteria. The government
reporting is expressed in government terms of obligations and commitments. By contrast,
contractors’ public financial data is expressed in terms of income statements, balance sheets,
and statements of cash flow. If government data was compared against contract data, research
must consider whether the timing of government obligations is consistent with industry revenue
recognition.
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Economic moat can also be assessed across other metrics such as costs reported by type
of acquisition programs. The variety of technologies used across defense products requires
different levels of capital investments by defense contractors. As a result, a specific program
type may yield higher or lower levels of economic moat for a defense contractor which may
dictate contractors’ decisions on which defense programs to feasibly pursue. This research can
be advanced by reviewing defense contractors’ financial statements relative to cost reporting by
programs provided in the government Form 1921‐3 known as the Contractor Business Data
Report. As of the timing of this study, Cost Assessment Data Enterprise (CADE) was undergoing a
modernization of government‐mandated reporting and formatting. According to CADE, the cost
data provided by contractors in Form 1921‐3 will have improved allocation reporting.
Additionally, the reported contractor labor and overhead rates will align with Final Proposal
Revisions, Defense Contract Audit Agency audits, proposals and negotiations, pricing models,
and more importantly will provide the DoD with enhanced insight into contractor cost rates.
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Appendix
Table 7 – Summary of Literature on Profit and Cost Shifting of Government Contractors
Author(s)

Topic

Date

Weidenbaum

Profit

1968

Summary of Results
Period Studied
Data Analyzed
Defense contractors have greater profitability relative to typical
1952‐1955; 1962‐
Firm‐level financial data
industrial corporations
1965
Investments in defense contractors during the 1950’s were 2x
1948‐1961; 1958‐
Stock market data
profitable compared to stocks listed in NYSE. Defense contractor
1968
stocks did as well as NYSE stocks in the 1960's.
Defense and manufacturing firms do not have significant difference
in profit; there is no significant association between a firm’s
1960 ‐ 1969
Firm‐level financial data
percentage of defense business and profitability; and defense
contractors profit on both civilian and military business at the same
rate
Defense business negatively impacted overall sales for corporate
1963‐1982
Firm‐level financial data
firms
CASB regulation is a deterrent to contractors' ability to extract
1968 ‐ 1970
Stock market data
excessive cost reimbursements
Regulatory system for defense contractors promotes innovation by
1960's ‐ 1970's
Stock market data
providing prizes in the form of economic profit

Stigler & Friedland

Profit

1971

Bohi

Profit

1973

Greer & Liao

Profit

1986

Pownall

Cost Shifting

1986

Rogerson

Profit

1989

Rogerson

Cost Shifting

Regulatory process incentivizes cost shifting among firms with
N/A; Theoretical
1992 commercial and defense segments due to cost sensitivity of defense
N/A; Theoretical analysis
analysis
products and cost accounting practices of defense contractors

Thomas & Tung

Cost Shifting

Defense contractors tend to overfund pensions when employees
1992 work on defense contracts by using overfunding strategies “across‐
contract” or “across‐time”

Lichtenberg

Cost Shifting

1992

McGowan & Vendrzyk

Cost Shifting

2002

Zhong & Gribbin

Profit

2009

Wang & San Miguel

Profit

2012

Chen & Gunny

Cost Shifting

2014

1970's ‐ 1980's

Firm‐level pension data;
actuarial data

Profitability of commercial business by government contractors is
higher than that of commercial business by non‐government
1983 ‐ 1989
Firm‐level financial data
contractors; profit increases as a contractor’s ratio of governmental
to total sales increases
No evidence that excess profitability of defense contractors is due
1984 ‐ 1989;
Firm‐level financial data
to cost shifting
1994 ‐ 1998
Risk, innovation, and influence have a positive relationship with
1984 ‐ 1999
Firm‐level financial data
defense contractor profit rates
Defense contractors earn excessive profits compared to industry
peers; excessive profit is more pronounced post‐1992
1950 ‐ 2010; post‐
Firm‐level financial data
1992
after significant industry consolidation; and profitability increases
with poorer corporate governance
Government contractor profitability and discretionary expenses
increase during periods with cost‐plus contracts relative to years
2005 ‐ 2010
Firm‐level financial data
without
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Table 8 – Sample Firm‐Year Observations by SIC Code & Firm
Major
SIC
SIC Description
Group
16
1600 HEAVY CONSTRUCTION OTHER THAN BUILDING CONST CONTRACTORS

36
37

3600 ELECTRONIC & OTHER ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT (NO COMPUTER EQUIP)
3711 MOTOR VEHICLES AND PASSENGER CAR BODIES
3720 AIRCRAFT AND PARTS
3721 AIRCRAFT
3724 AIRCRAFT ENGINES & ENGINE PARTS
3730 SHIP AND BOAT BUILDING AND REPAIRING

38

3760 GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES AND PARTS
3812 SEARCH, DETECTION, NAVIGATION, GUIDANCE, AERONAUTICAL SYS

45
51

3829 MEASURING AND CONTROLLING DEVICES, NEC
4513 AIR COURIER SERVICES
5122 WHOLESALE‐DRUGS PROPRIETARIES & DRUGGISTS SUNDRIES

59
63
73

5961 RETAIL CATALOG AND MAIL ORDER HOUSES
6324 HOSPITAL & MEDICAL SERVICE PLANS
7373 SERVICES COMPUTER INTEGRATED SYSTEMS DESIGN

87

8711
8741
8742
8744

SERVICES ENGINEERING SERVICES
SERVICES MANAGEMENT SERVICES
SERVICES MANAGEMENT CONSULTING SERVICES
SERVICES FACILITIES SUPPORT MANAGEMENT SERVICES

73

Ticker
FLR
GLDD
KBR
J
GE
OSK
AIR
TXT
BA
RTX
HON
GD
HII
LMT
LHX
NOC
CUB
FDX
ABC
CAH
MCK
CDW
CNC
CACI
LDOS
SAIC
ACM
MANT
BAH
VEC

No. of
Observations
10
10
9
10
10
9
9
8
9
10
10
10
9
10
10
10
9
9
9
9
9
7
10
9
10
6
9
10
9
6
N = 274

Ticker

No. of
Observations

J

9

BA
RTX

9
10

GD
HII
LMT
LHX
NOC
CUB

10
9
10
3
10
7

CACI
LDOS
SAIC
ACM
MANT
BAH
VEC

9
10
6
9
10
9
6
N = 136

Table 9 – Sample of Contractors by Ticker and Company Name
Ticker

Company Name

ABC
ACM
AIR
BA
BAH
CACI
CAH
CDW
CNC
CUB
GLDD
FDX
FLR
GD
GE
HII
HON
J
KBR
LDOS
LHX
LMT
MANT
MCK
NOC
OSK
RTX
SAIC
TXT
VEC

AmerisourceBergen Corporation
AECOM
AAR Corp
The Boeing Company
Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation
CACI International Inc
Cardinal Health, Inc
CDW Corporation
Centene Corporation
Cubic Corporation
Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company
FedEx Corporation
Fluor Corporation
General Dynamics Corporation
General Electric Company
Huntington Ingalls Industries
Honeywell International Inc
Jacobs Engineering Group Inc
KBR, Inc
Leidos
L3Harris Technologies
Lockheed Martin Corporation
ManTech International Corporation
McKesson Corporation
Northrop Grumman Corporation
Oshkosh Corporation
Raytheon Technologies Corporation
Science Applications International Corporation
Textron Inc
Vectrus
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Table 10 – Variable Averages by SIC and Company Name
Average
MOAT %

Average
ROIC %

Average
WACC %

Average Intangible
Assets %

Average Fixed
Asset Turnover

Average Total
Asset Turnover

HEAVY CONSTRUCTION OTHER THAN BUILDING CONST CONTRACTORS (1600)
Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company
Fluor Corporation
KBR, Inc
Jacobs Engineering Group Inc

‐3.16%
‐4.82%
‐4.50%
‐4.00%
0.67%

5.25%
3.23%
5.50%
4.60%
7.67%

8.35%
8.04%
9.90%
8.80%
6.67%

2.01%
0.31%
0.46%
3.71%
3.55%

21.05
1.95
22.51
26.30
33.45

1.57
0.88
2.55
1.32
1.53

$
$
$
$
$

9,580,818,133
710,021,300
20,216,858,900
6,450,200,000
10,946,192,333

ELECTRONIC & OTHER ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT (NO COMPUTER EQUIP) (3600)
General Electric Company

‐5.40%
‐5.40%

0.00%
0.00%

5.30%
5.30%

11.58%
11.58%

2.16
2.16

0.25
0.25

$
$

123,950,500,000
123,950,500,000

MOTOR VEHICLES AND PASSENGER CAR BODIES (3711)
Oshkosh Corporation

0.89%
0.89%

12.33%
12.33%

11.44%
11.44%

8.57%
8.57%

17.08
17.08

1.49
1.49

$
$

7,271,922,222
7,271,922,222

AIRCRAFT AND PARTS (3720)
AAR Corp
Textron Inc

‐1.81%
‐3.36%
‐0.25%

7.32%
4.52%
10.13%

9.19%
7.89%
10.50%

4.60%
4.68%
4.51%

6.09
6.68
5.51

1.01
1.09
0.94

$
$
$

7,617,630,833
1,874,886,667
13,360,375,000

AIRCRAFT (3721)
The Boeing Company

31.67%
31.67%

40.00%
40.00%

8.11%
8.11%

3.47%
3.47%

7.99
7.99

0.98
0.98

$
$

86,264,333,333
86,264,333,333

AIRCRAFT ENGINES & ENGINE PARTS (3724)
Raytheon Technologies Corporation
Honeywell International Inc

6.75%
6.40%
7.10%

14.00%
12.70%
15.30%

7.35%
6.50%
8.20%

16.63%
24.48%
8.77%

7.14
7.05
7.23

0.77
0.72
0.82

$
$
$

49,804,650,000
61,224,000,000
38,385,300,000

SHIP AND BOAT BUILDING AND REPAIRING (3730)
General Dynamics Corporation
Huntington Ingalls Industries

7.55%
8.10%
7.00%

15.58%
15.50%
15.67%

8.03%
7.50%
8.56%

5.36%
4.28%
6.45%

6.48
9.45
3.51

1.04
0.92
1.16

$
$
$

20,051,200,000
32,806,400,000
7,296,000,000

GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES AND PARTS (3760)
Lockheed Martin Corporation

28.60%
28.60%

34.80%
34.80%

6.30%
6.30%

3.87%
3.87%

9.48
9.48

1.19
1.19

$
$

48,726,600,000
48,726,600,000

SEARCH, DETECTION, NAVIGATION, GUIDANCE, AERONAUTICAL SYS (3812)
L3Harris Technologies
Northrop Grumman Corporation

6.45%
4.30%
8.60%

13.00%
10.90%
15.10%

6.55%
6.60%
6.50%

7.98%
14.69%
1.26%

7.15
7.20
7.10

0.87
0.81
0.93

$
$
$

16,412,585,000
5,545,170,000
27,280,000,000

MEASURING AND CONTROLLING DEVICES, NEC (3829)
Cubic Corporation

‐1.42%
‐1.42%

5.71%
5.71%

7.13%
7.13%

6.16%
6.16%

19.41
19.41

1.16
1.16

$
$

1,347,285,000
1,347,285,000

AIR COURIER SERVICES (4513)
FedEx Corporation

0.78%
0.78%

9.33%
9.33%

8.67%
8.67%

0.57%
0.57%

2.43
2.43

1.36
1.36

$
$

51,679,777,778
51,679,777,778

WHOLESALE‐DRUGS PROPRIETARIES & DRUGGISTS SUNDRIES (5122)
AmerisourceBergen Corporation
Cardinal Health, Inc
McKesson Corporation

7.33%
12.11%
4.67%
5.22%

12.15%
15.00%
10.00%
11.44%

4.74%
2.56%
5.22%
6.44%

1.49%
1.17%
1.37%
1.91%

91.27
111.64
67.08
95.10

4.16
5.08
3.87
3.52

$
$
$
$

136,104,430,815
127,637,292,444
115,676,000,000
165,000,000,000

RETAIL CATALOG AND MAIL ORDER HOUSES (5961)
CDW Corporation

7.65%
7.65%

13.40%
13.40%

5.75%
5.75%

7.57%
7.57%

83.65
83.65

2.11
2.11

$
$

14,182,585,714
14,182,585,714

HOSPITAL & MEDICAL SERVICE PLANS (6324)
Centene Corporation

4.70%
4.70%

9.30%
9.30%

4.70%
4.70%

1.65%
1.65%

36.49
36.49

2.86
2.86

$
$

29,169,742,500
29,169,742,500

SERVICES COMPUTER INTEGRATED SYSTEMS DESIGN (7373)
CACI International Inc
Leidos
Science Applications International Corporation

2.49%
1.00%
1.64%
4.83%

9.58%
8.22%
8.51%
12.00%

6.90%
7.00%
6.87%
6.83%

5.24%
5.35%
5.20%
5.18%

46.50
51.52
29.33
58.64

1.57
1.25
1.46
2.00

$
$
$
$

5,659,723,259
3,940,569,778
8,724,600,000
4,314,000,000

SERVICES ENGINEERING SERVICES (8711)
AECOM

‐3.00%
‐3.00%

4.33%
4.33%

7.67%
7.67%

1.80%
1.80%

29.87
29.87

1.43
1.43

$
$

14,077,642,222
14,077,642,222

SERVICES MANAGEMENT SERVICES (8741)
ManTech International Corporation

‐0.40%
‐0.40%

6.70%
6.70%

7.00%
7.00%

8.31%
8.31%

65.42
65.42

1.28
1.28

$
$

2,119,021,500
2,119,021,500

SERVICES‐MANAGEMENT CONSULTING SERVICES (8742)
Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation

9.78%
9.78%

14.67%
14.67%

4.78%
4.78%

4.13%
4.13%

38.69
38.69

1.81
1.81

$
$

5,783,211,333
5,783,211,333

SERVICES FACILITIES SUPPORT MANAGEMENT SERVICES (8744)
Vectrus
Sample Average

7.37%
7.37%
4.53%

15.83%
15.83%
11.75%

8.46%
8.46%
7.20%

0.29%
0.29%
5.18%

191.19
191.19
35.17

2.39
2.39
1.64

$
$
$

1,225,201,000
1,225,201,000
34,572,856,301

SIC Description (Code) and Company Name
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Average Total Sales

Table 11 – Variable Formulas and Description

Role

Formula

Moatit

Variable

DV

ROIC ‐ WACC

ROIC it

Calculates DV

Operating Incomet‐1(1 ‐ tax rate) /
Book Value of Invested Capital t‐1

Description
Measure of firm i's ability to receive a return from operations above its capital cost at time
t. Represents sustainable competitive advantage.
Return on invested capital for firm i at time t . Measures the return earned from capital
investments relative to the capital provided toward that investment.

(E/V x Re) + ((D/V x Rd)* (1 – T))

WACC it

Calculates DV

Intangible Assetsit

IV

Fixed Asset Turnoverit

IV

Total Asset Turnoverit

IV

Cost Contractit

IV

Defense Salesit
SICit
Total Salesit
Yearit

IV
Control Variable
Control Variable
Control Variable

Where:
E
= value of the firm’s equity (market capitalization)
D
= value of the firm’s debt (book value)
V
= total value of all equity and debt capital (E + D)
E/V = ratio of total capital that is equity
D/V = ratio of total capital that is debt
Re
= cost of equity (required rate of return)
Rd
= cost of debt (yield to maturity on existing debt)
T
= tax rate

Weighed average cost of capital for firm i at time t . Measure of a firm's hurdle rate
required by capital providers in exchange for the capital provided. As an economic rate of
return, WACC is the minimum return that a firm must earn from investing this capital.

Measure of a firm's capital intensity for firm i at time t . Measures revenue generated per
dollar of intellectual property. Proxy for economic moat attribute of intangible asset
investments.
Measures firm effectiveness in generating sales from fixed assets for firm i at time t .
Proxy for economic moat attribute of efficiency scale.
Measures firm effectiveness in generating sales from long‐term and short‐term fixed
assets for firm i at time t . Proxy for economic moat attribute of efficiency scale.
Percentage of total sales attributed to cost reimbursement contracts for firm i at time t .
Proxy for economic moat attributes of cost advantage and pricing power.
Percentage of total sales attributed to defense sales for firm i at time t . Proxy for
economic moat attributes of cost advantage and pricing power.
Control variable for industry for firm i at time t .
Control variable for size for firm i at time t .
Control variable for time for firm i at time t .

Intangible assets less Goodwill /
Total revenue
Total revenue /
Avg. property, plant, & equipment
Total revenue /
Avg. total assets
% of total sales attributed
to cost contracts
% of total sales attributed
to defense sales
N/A
N/A
N/A
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